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Abstract
We develop a two-country general equilibrium model where monop-
olistically competitive and oligopolistic industries coexist, and intra-
rm division of labor involves economies of scale. If market size in-
creases, the productivity of all industries and welfare improve. How-
ever, as the proportion of trading sectors rises, the productivity of
trading industries increases, but that of non-trading industries de-
creases. Although the welfare eect of expansion of trading sectors is
analytically unclear, a numerical simulation tells that it is positive.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Recent evidence on international trade has reached one stylized fact that
`engaging in international trade is an exceedingly rare activity.' (Bernard
et al., 2007, p. 105) According to Bernard et al. (2007), only 4% of the
US rms exported in 2000. Mayer and Ottaviano (2008) and Freund and
Pierola (2015) also nd similar evidence for the 7 western European countries
and 32 developing countries, respectively.1 This stylized fact highlights the
importance of a small number of large rms (superstar rms) in international
trade today, and it is required to depart from the monopolistic competition
model with massless rms.2 The reality is well described by a coexistence of
monopolistic competition and oligopoly.
In order to incorporate the above recognition, we develop a two-country
model that has the following features. First, we assume a continuum of in-
dustries, some of which are monopolistically competitive and the others of
which are oligopolistic. Second, we allow both trading and non-trading sec-
tors. Third, following the formulation of division of labor in Chaney and
Ossa (2013), we stress the productivity eect of trade.3 In this model, we
dene trade liberalization in two ways; an increase in market size like Krug-
man (1979) and Chaney and Ossa (2013) and an increase in the proportion of
trading sectors like Bastos and Straume (2012) and Kreickemeier and Meland
(2013). We show that market size expansion raises the productivity of all
industries and welfare, which is a straightforward extension of Chaney and
Ossa (2013). However, the eects of an increase in the share of trading sec-
tors are complex. It raises the productivity of trading industries, but lowers
that of non-trading industries. Furthermore, its welfare eect is analytically
ambiguous. However, a numerical simulation suggests that it raises welfare.
1More recent empirical studies are mentioned in Section V.
2To our knowledge, Neary (2004) is the rst to point out the limitation of the monop-
olistic competition model in international trade.
3Because the threshold between trading and non-trading sectors is assumed exogenous,
the reallocation eect of Melitz (2003) is assumed away.
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This paper is inuenced by two strands of literature. The rst concerns a
general oligopolistic equilibrium (GOLE) model of Neary (2003, 2016).4 As-
suming a continuum of oligopolistic industries and supposing that `oligopolis-
tic rms should be modeled as large in their own markets but small in the
economy as a whole,' (Neary, 2016, p. 687) he presents a consistent and
tractable model of oligopoly that has many applications. While the existing
papers employing this approach assume an oligopoly in all sectors, we in-
troduce monopolistically competitive sectors. The second related literature
is about the coexistence of monopolistic competition and oligopoly. Shimo-
mura and Thisse (2012) rst characterize such a mixed market in a closed
economy. Then, Parenti (2018) uses a slightly dierent model, and considers
the eect of trade.5 Parenti (2018) shows that trade liberalization neces-
sarily improves welfare.6 Vavoura (2017) also obtains the similar result in
a CES preference model. While these authors assume that monopolistically
competitive and oligopolistic rms coexist in a single industry, we consider
a dierent situation in which monopolistically competitive and oligopolistic
industries coexist.
This paper is organized as follows. Sections II presents a model. Sections
III and IV address the eects of trade on the productivities and welfare,
respectively. Section V oers some discussions about our model and results.
Section VI concludes.
II. MODEL
This section presents a model. Suppose two identical countries (Home
and Foreign), two industries (monopolistic competition and Cournot com-
4The working paper version of Neary (2016) was released in 2002. Colacicco (2015) is
a comprehensive survey.
5The utility function in Shimomura and Thisse (2012) is CES, but that in Parenti
(2018) is quadratic.
6Parenti (2018) denes trade liberalization in two ways; an increase in the number of
trading countries and a reduction in trade cost.
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petition), and one factor (labor). There is a continuum of goods on a unit
interval, and z denotes the threshold that divides a set of monopolistically
competitive goods and a set of oligopolized goods; good z is supplied under
monopolistic competition for z 2 [0; z] and under oligopoly for z 2 [z; 1]. In
addition, ez represents a proportion of trading industries. Thus, the whole
economy comprises four kinds of goods. If z 2 [0; ezz], the good is a tradable
produced under monopolistic competition, z 2 [ezz; z], the good is a non-
tradable produced under monopolistic competition, z 2 [z; z + ez (1  z)],
the good is a tradable produced under oligopoly, and if z 2 [z + ez (1  z) ; 1],
the good is a non-tradable produced under oligopoly.
While this model contains many notations, we explain the process of divi-
sion of labor, consumer behavior, rm behavior in monopolistic competition,
rm behavior in an oligopoly, and market-clearing in the labor market in
order.
a) Division of labor
As in Chaney and Ossa (2013), a production process involves division of
labor.7 In order to produce one unit of nal good, each rm performs a series
of tasks on a closed interval [0; 2]. If one task, say, !1 2 (0; 2) is completed,
an intermediate good !1 is produced. Then, !1 is used for the production
of the next task, say, !2 2 (!1; 2) by performing a task ! 2 [!1; !2]. Letting
c be a core competency associated with each task, labor demand needed for
performing one unit of task ! 2 [!1; !2] is assumed to be given by
l(!1; !2) =
1
2
Z !2
!1
jc  !jd!;  > 0:
In addition, each team that performs a task has to input xed amount of
7See Chaney and Ossa (2013, p. 178) for a more detailed explanation.
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labor f > 0. Given these assumptions, per-rm total cost becomes
total cost = wt
 
f + y
Z 1

0
!d!
!
= w
 
tf +
yt 
1 + 
!
;
where w is the wage rate, t is the number of teams, and y is output. Mini-
mizing this cost with respect to t, the optimal number of teams is obtained
as
t =
"
y
(1 + )f
# 1
1+
: (1)
Throughout this paper, we call this cost-minimizing number of teams `rm
productivity.' Substituting (1) into total cost yields
total cost = w
"
(1 + )f

# 
1+
y
1
1+ ;
that is, `the production technology exhibits increasing returns to scale.'
(Chaney and Ossa, p. 178)
b) Preference and demand
We now consider utility maximization of consumers, and derive the demand
functions of each category of goods. There are L identical consumers in each
country whose preference is
U =
Z ezz
0
lnX1(z)dz +
Z z
ezz ln fX1(z)dz +
Z z+ez(1 z)
z
lnX2(z)dz +
Z 1
z+ez(1 z) ln fX2(z)dz
(2)
X1(z) 
"
mX
i=1
xi(z)
 +
mX
i=1
xi (z)

# 1

; fX1(z) 
24 emX
i=1
exi(z)
35
1

; (3)
where U is utility, X1(z); xi(z) and X2(z) are a per-capita quantity index of
monopolistically competitive tradables, consumption of them and consump-
tion of oligopolized tradables, respectively. And, m is the number of traded
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varieties. A tilde denotes the counterparts that are non-traded, and an as-
terisk is attached to a Foreign variable. Consumers choose consumption to
maximize (2) under the budget constraint:
Z ezz
0
"
mX
i=1
pi(z)xi(z) +
mX
i=1
pi (z)x

i (z)
#
dz +
Z z
ezz
24 emX
i=1
epi(z)exi(z)
35 dz
+
Z z+ez(1 z)
z
P2(z)X2(z)dz +
Z 1
z+ez(1 z) eP2(z)fX2(z)dz  I; (4)
where pi(z) and P2(z) are a price of each monopolistically competitive and
oligopolized tradable, respectively, and I is (nominal) income. The usage of
an asterisk and tilde is the same as above.
In deriving the demand function of each good, we employ Neary's (2003,
2016) approach. According to him, consumers and all rms including oligopolis-
tic rms take as given the marginal utility of income (Lagrangean multiplier
associated with the budget constraint) since they are small in the whole
economy. By making this assumption, Neary (2003, 2016) shows many in-
teresting results on the welfare eect of competition policy and international
trade, without worrying about the problems arising in general equilibrium
oligopoly models. We also adopt the same assumption, namely, marginal util-
ity of income serves as a numeraire and is normalized to unity. Then, solving
the rst-order conditions for utility maximization, the demand function of
each good is obtained as follows.
xi(z) =
pi(z)
1
 1
mX
i=1
pi(z)

 1 +
mX
i=1
pi (z)

 1
; xi (z) =
pi (z)
1
 1
mX
i=1
pi(z)

 1 +
mX
i=1
pi (z)

 1
(5)
exi(z) = epi(z) 1 1emX
i=1
epi(z)  1
(6)
X2(z) =
1
P2(z)
; fX2(z) = 1eP2(z) : (7)
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Since there are L + L = 2L identical consumers in the world, the market-
clearing condition of each good becomes
2Lxi(z) =
2Lpi(z)
1
 1
mX
i=1
pi(z)

 1 +
mX
i=1
pi (z)

 1
(8)
2Lxi (z) =
2Lpi (z)
1
 1
mX
i=1
pi(z)

 1 +
mX
i=1
pi (z)

 1
(9)
Lexi(z) = Lepi(z) 1 1emX
i=1
epi(z)  1
(10)
2L
P2(z)
=
nX
j=1
yj(z) +
nX
j=1
yj (z);
LeP2(z) =
nX
j=1
eyj(z);
where n  2 is the number of oligopolistic rms, yj(z) and yj (z) are output
of Home and Foreign oligopolistic rms that export, respectively, and eyj(z)
is output of non-trading oligopolists. Solving the last two equations for P2(z)
and eP2(z), the inverse demand function of oligopolized goods is given by
P2(z) =
2L
nX
j=1
yj(z) +
nX
j=1
yj (z)
; eP2(z) = LnX
j=1
eyj(z) : (11)
Given the demand and inverse demand functions above, the rm prot
in each category of industries is dened by
1i(z)  2Lpi(z)xi(z)  w
"
(1 + )f

# 
1+
[2Lxi(z)]
1
1+
e1i(z)  Lepi(z)exi(z)  w
"
(1 + )f

# 
1+
[Lexi(z)] 11+
2j(z)  P2(z)yj(z)  w
"
(1 + )f

# 
1+
[yj(z)]
1
1+
e2j(z)  eP2(z)eyj(z)  w
"
(1 + )f

# 
1+
[eyj(z)] 11+
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In what follows, prot maximization in monopolistically and oligopolistically
competitive sectors is formalized.
c) Monopolistic competition
Each monopolistically competitive rm chooses price to maximize prot,
given the market demand function in (8), (9) and (10).8 Then, the markup
pricing rule is derived:
pi(z) =
w
(1 + )
"
(1 + )f

# 
1+
[2Lxi(z)]
1
1+
 1
epi(z) = w
(1 + )
"
(1 + )f

# 
1+
[Lexi(z)] 11+ 1 :
And, since free entry and exit drives prot to zero, price must be equal to
average cost:
pi(z) = w
"
(1 + )f

# 
1+
[2Lxi(z)]
1
1+
 1
epi(z) = w
"
(1 + )f

# 
1+
[Lexi(z)] 11+ 1 (12)
At this stage, we make a useful but admittedly articial assumption.
Specically, let us suppose that  depends on per-capita consumption of a
dierentiated good like (xi) and  (exi). That is, consumers and rms take
 as given in maximizing utility and prot while it is a function of per-
capita consumption. One justication is that the markup in Chaney and
Ossa (2013) also depends on per-capita consumption.9 Considering that the
8The result is obtained even if output is chosen.
9Chaney and Ossa (2013) assume a non-CES utility function
U =
mX
i=1
u(xi) +
mX
i=1
u(xi );
which follows Krugman (1979). Under this preference, the markup becomes (x)=[(x) 1],
where (x)   u0(x)=[xu00(x)].
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markup in our model is 1=, it may be fair to assume that  depends on per-
capita consumption x as in Krugman (1979) and Chaney and Ossa (2013).
This variable markup is empirically well recognized.10
If one accepts this assumption, dividing the markup pricing rule by the
zero prot condition yields
(1 + ) (xi(z)) = (1 + ) (exi(z)) = 1:
Since this equation holds for all dierentiated goods, per-capita consumption
is uniquely determined in the above equation, and it holds that xi(z) =
xi(z) = x for all i and z. Substituting this result into the market-clearing
conditions, we have
2Lx =
2L
2mpi(z)
; Lx =
Lfmepi(z) ;
and hence the number of varieties is derived as follows.
m =
1
2pi(z)x
; fm = 1epi(z)x; (13)
where pi(z) and epi(z) are given by (12) with xi(z) and exi(z) replaced by x.
d) Oligopoly
Each oligopolist chooses output to maximize prots in a Cournot fashion.
Solving the system of the rst-order conditions for prot maximization, the
Cournot equilibrium outputs are obtained by
y =
"
(2n  1)(1 + )L
2n2w
#1+ "

(1 + )f
#
; ey = "(n  1)(1 + )L
n2w
#1+ "

(1 + )f
#
;(14)
where subscript j and argument z are suppressed because all rms produce
the same amount.
10See, for example, Edmond et al. (2015), Lu and Yu (2015) and De Loecker et al.
(2016)
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e) General equilibrium
Having characterized the equilibrium in each industry, we now close the
model by introducing the labor market-clearing condition:
L =
Z ezz
0
m
"
(1 + )f

# 
1+
(2Lx)
1
1+ dz +
Z z
ezz fm
"
(1 + )f

# 
1+
(Lx)
1
1+ dz
+
Z z+ez(1 z)
z
n
"
(1 + )f

# 
1+
y
1
1+ +
Z 1
z+ez(1 z) n
"
(1 + )f

# 
1+ ey 11+ dz
=
zL
w
+
(1  z) (1 + )L [(2n  1)ez + 2(n  1) (1  ez)]
2nw
;
where L, which stands for the number of consumers, represents the labor
endowment since each consumer inelastically supplies one unit of labor in
the left-hand side. The last equality follows by substituting m and fm in (13)
and y and ey in (14). Solving this equation for w, the equilibrium wage rate
is determined by
w =
2nz + (1  z) (1 + ) [(2n  1)ez + 2(n  1) (1  ez)]
2n
: (15)
Once the wage rate is derived, all the other endogenous variables are also
obtained. From (15), we see that:
Proposition 1: Market size L has no eect on the equilibrium wage, but the
wage rate rises with the portion of trading industries ez.
Proof. The former part is trivial, and the latter part is proved by dierenti-
ating (15) with respect to ez:
@w
@ez = (1  z) (1 + )2n > 0:
jj
The intuition behind this result is as follows. Since both labor demand
and supply are proportionate with L, namely, L is multiplied on both the left-
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and right-hand sides in the labor market-clearing condition, the equilibrium
wage is not aected by L. If, in contrast, ez increases, labor demand from
trading industries expands and that from non-trading industries contracts.
However, output and labor demand of trading industries is larger than those
of non-trading industries, and hence the former eect outweighs the latter
eect, resulting in a higher wage rate. This result is not interesting per
se, but it will play an important role in interpreting the eects of trade on
productivities and welfare.
In the variant of the two-country GOLE model with linear demand and
no monopolistically competitive sector, Bastos and Straume (2012) and Kre-
ickemeier and Meland (2013) also establish that the competitive wage rate
rises with the proportion of trading industries. In addition, assuming that
all industries are oligopolistic, Fujiwara and Kamei (2018) arrive at the same
result.11 In contrast, one can show that if all industries are monopolistically
competitive, a change in ez has no eect on the wage rate. This is because an
increase in ez raises labor demand in the trading industries, but lowers labor
demand in the non-trading industries by exactly the same amount.
III. PRODUCTIVITY EFFECT
This section addresses the eect of trade on the productivity. Following
Chaney and Ossa (2013) and Kamei (2014), we refer to the optimal number
of teams in (1) as rm productivity. Then, rm productivity of each mo-
nopolistically competitive rm and oligopolistic rm is respectively obtained
by
t1 =
"
2Lx
(1 + )f
# 1
1+
; et1 =
"
Lx
(1 + )f
# 1
1+
(16)
t2 =
"
y
(1 + )f
# 1
1+
; et2 =
"
ey
(1 + )f
# 1
1+
; (17)
11This case is easily reproduced by substituting z = 0 in our model.
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where t1 is rm productivity of a trading rm in monopolistic competition,
t2 is rm productivity of a trading rm in an oligopoly, and et1 and et2 are the
counterparts of non-trading rms. Aggregating these, we have
T1 
Z ezz
0
mt1dz =
ezzL
(1 + )wf
; eT1  Z zezz fmet1dz = (1  ez) zL(1 + )wf (18)
T2 
Z z+ez(1 z)
z
nt2dz =
ez (1  z) (2n  1)L
2nwf
eT2  Z 1
z+ez(1 z) net2dz = (1  ez) (1  z) (n  1)Lnwf ; (19)
where T1 is the aggregate productivity of the trading industry under monop-
olistic competition, T2 is that of the trading industry under oligopoly, andeT1 and eT2 are the counterparts for non-trading industries. Using these, we
can obtain the productivity of the whole trading and non-trading industries
as follows.
T1 + T2 =
ezL [2zn+ (1  z) (2n  1)(1 + )]
2n(1 + )wf
=
ezL [2nz + (1  z) (2n  1)(1 + )]
(1 + )f f2nz + (1  z) (1 + ) [ez + 2(n  1)]g (20)
eT1 + eT2 = (1  ez) L [nz + (1  z) (n  1)(1 + )]
n(1 + )wf
=
2 (1  ez) L [nz + (1  z) (n  1)(1 + )]
(1 + )f f2nz + (1  z) (1 + ) [ez + 2(n  1)]g (21)
These expressions allow us to know how primitive parameters, e.g. L and ez,
aect the productivity of trading and non-trading sectors. Such eects are
summarized in:
Proposition 2: The productivity of both trading and non-trading industries
increases with market size. However, an increase in the portion of trading
industries raises the productivity of the whole trading industry, but lowers
that of the whole non-trading industry.
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Proof. The eect of L is easily checked since (20) and (21) are increasing in
L. On the other hand, dierentiating (20) and (21) with respect to ez yields
d(T1 + T2)
dez = 2L [nz + (1  z) (n  1)(1 + )] [2nz + (1  z) (2n  1)(1 + )](1 + )f f2nz + (1  z) (1 + ) [ez + 2(n  1)]g2 > 0
d
 eT1 + eT2
dez =  2L [nz + (1  z) (n  1)(1 + )] [2nz + (1  z) (2n  1)(1 + )](1 + )f f2nz + (1  z) (1 + ) [ez + 2(n  1)]g2
=  d(T1 + T2)
dez < 0;
which establishes the latter half of the proposition. jj
The reason why the productivities increase with market size is simple but
dierent between the monopolistically competitive and oligopolistic sectors.
When L rises, total output of monopolistically competitive rms increases,
and hence average cost and goods prices decline. In addition, Eq. (13) tells
that lower goods prices expand the variety of dierentiated goods. These ef-
fects jointly raise the productivity of monopolistically competitive industries.
In contrast, an increase in L also improves the productivity of oligopolistic
industries because it increases output of all rms, i.e. it has a pro-competitive
eect.12
The eects of an increase in ez are more complicated. On the one hand,
the aggregate productivity of trading industries rises and that of non-trading
industries declines as the rst-order eect. On the other hand, as shown in
Proposition 1, the wage rate rises with ez, which has a negative impact on
productivities. However, since the rst-order eect is stronger than the indi-
rect eect through the rise in wage rate, the trading industries' productivity
improves. On the contrary, the non-trading industries' productivity neces-
sarily decreases because both the direct and indirect eects explained above
have a negative impact.
12The pro-competitive eect of trade between identical countries is, to our knowledge,
shown rst in Markusen (1981).
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IV. WELFARE EFFECT
This section investigates the welfare eect of an increase in L and ez.
For this purpose, let us derive (per-capita) welfare W . Relating the market-
clearing conditions of nal goods to the utility function in (2) and rearranging
terms, W is obtained as
W 
Z ezz
0
ln

2mx
 1


dz +
Z z
ezz ln
fmx 1  dz
+
Z z+ez(1 z)
z
ln

ny
L

dz +
Z 1
z+ez(1 z) ln

ney
L

dz
= U1 + U2; (22)
where U1 is utility from consuming monopolistically competitive products,
and U2 is utility from consuming oligopolized goods. Subutility U1 can be
rewritten as
U1 = ezz ln h(2m) 1xi+ (1  ez) z ln fm 1x
=
z

ln
8<: 1w
"
Lx
(1 + )f
# 
1+
9=;+ ezz ln (2)  z(1  ) lnx
= z(1 + ) ln
"
2n
2nz + (1  z) (1 + ) (ez + 2n  2)
#
+z ln
"
L
(1 + )f
#
+ ezz ln 2; (23)
by substituting (12), (13) and (15). Similarly, U2 has an alternative expres-
sion
U2 = ez (1  z) lnny
L

+ (1  ez) (1  z) lnney
L

= (1  z) ln
(
n
"
L
(1 + )f
# 
1 + 
n2w
1+)
+(1  z) (1 + )
ez ln2n  1
2

+ (1  ez) ln(n  1)
= (1  z) ln
(
1 + 
n1+2
 
L
f
! "
2n
2nz + (1  z) (1 + ) (ez + 2n  2)
#)
+(1  z) (1 + )
ez ln2n  1
2

+ (1  ez) ln(n  1) ; (24)
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where use is made of (14) and (15). Summing (23) and (24) up, per-capita
welfare is nally obtained as a function of parameters as follows.
W = (1 + ) ln
"
2n
2nz + (1  z) (1 + ) (ez + 2n  2)
#
+ z ln
"
L
(1 + )f
#
+ ezz ln 2
+ (1  z) ln
"
1 + 
n1+2
 
L
f
!#
+ (1  z) (1 + )
ez ln2n  1
2

+ (1  ez) ln(n  1) :
(25)
Based on these preparations, we now explore how an increase in L and ez
aects welfare. This is formally stated in:
Proposition 3: Welfare increases with market size, but it is unclear whether
welfare increases with the proportion of trading industries.
Proof. Since W in (22) is monotonically increasing in L, the former part is
proved. To see the eect of ez, let us dierentiate (22) with respect to ez:
dW
dez = z ln 2 + (1  z) (1 + ) ln

2n  1
2n  2

  (1  z) (1 + )
2
2nz + (1  z) (1 + ) (ez + 2n  2) : (26)
The sign of (26) can be both positive and negative because the rst two terms
are positive but the last term is negative. jj
It is no surprise that welfare improves as the market size expands. The
reason is that an increase in market size raises the product variety of mo-
nopolistically competitive goods and promotes competition, namely, reduces
the goods price in the oligopolistic industries.
If the proportion of trading industries increases, there are two competing
eects on welfare. First, noting that prices of tradables are lower than those
of non-tradables, a rise in ez tends to raise welfare by expanding the more
ecient trading sectors. Second, as shown in Proposition 1, an increase in ez
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induces the equilibrium wage to rise. This raises the good prices of monopo-
listically competitive goods, and reduces the product variety. Simultaneously,
the higher wage induced by an increase in ez decreases output of oligopolistic
rms, and raises the price of oligopolistic goods. Since the former eect has a
positive eect on welfare and the latter eect has a negative eect, the total
eect proves ambiguous.
Because it is analytically ambiguous whether welfare rises with ez, we now
resort to a numerical simulation. In order to neutralize the bias between the
monopolistically competitive and oligopolistic industries, set z = 1=2. And,
let us set the other parameters as  = 1; n = 2 and L=f = 20. Then, W in
(25) is given by a function of ez only:
W = 2 ln

4ez + 4

+
1
2
ln 10 +
ez
2
ln 2 +
1
2
ln 5 + ez ln 3
2
:
The graph of W above is depicted by Figure 1 in the ez W plane. It is clear
that welfare is monotonically increasing in ez, and hence we can conclude that
welfare necessarily improves as a result of trade liberalization.
Figure 1 around here
V. DISCUSSION13
This section addresses four topics that are ignored in the previous sec-
tions. First, we briey explain what follows if the whole industry is either
monopolistically competitive or oligopolistic. Second, we consider the special
but possibly realistic case in which trading industries are oligopolistic and
non-trading industries are monopolistically competitive. Third, the dier-
ence in competitiveness between monopolistically competitive and oligopolis-
tic rms is derived in our model. Finally, we relate our theoretical ndings
to the existing empirical evidence.
13This section is based on the referees' comments, which are gratefully acknowledged.
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a) No coexistence of monopolistic competition and oligopoly
Thus far, we have focused on the case in which monopolistic competition and
oligopoly coexist. We now address what follows if all industries are either
monopolistically competitive or oligopolistic. If all industries are monopo-
listically competitive, an increase in market size L and the proportion of
trading sectors ez necessarily improves welfare for the following reason. If
L rises, total output of all rms increases, and the price of all goods falls
while the equilibrium wage remains unchanged. Hence, the price index of
consumers decreases, and welfare rises. If ez rises, there are two eects. The
rst is the eect of increasing the traded variety, which has a positive eect
on welfare. The second is the eect of reducing the wage rate, which lowers
the product price of all varieties and raises welfare.
In contrast, the results dier if all industries are oligopolistic.14 In this
case, an increase in L improves welfare, but the welfare eect of an increase
in ez is unclear for the following reason. If L rises, all rms in both the trading
and non-trading industries increase output, but the equilibrium wage is not
aected. Therefore, the price of both traded and non-traded goods declines,
and welfare improves. However, the eect of an increase in ez is more complex.
On the one hand, an increase in ez promotes competition among trading rms,
tending to raise welfare. On the other hand, the wage rate rises with ez, which,
in turn, raises the price of both traded and non-traded goods, and tends to
lower welfare. As a result, it is ambiguous whether an increase in ez improves
welfare when oligopoly prevails in all industries.
14This case is examined in details in Fujiwara and Kamei (2018).
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b) Oligopoly in trading industries and monopolistic com-
petition in non-trading industries
As is noted in Introduction, growing evidence suggests that a small number
of rms engage in exporting.15 Thus, it is natural to ask what happens when
trading industries are oligopolistic and non-trading industries are monopo-
listically competitive. In this special case, the per-capita utility function can
be re-dened as
u =
Z ez
0
ln fX1(z)dz + Z 1ez lnX2(z)dz;
where fX1(z) is the quantity index of non-traded goods (monopolistically
competitive goods), and X2(z) is consumption of traded goods (oligopolized
goods), where fX1(z) is dened in Eq. (3). Note that in the present case, an
expansion of trading industries is modeled by a decrease in ez. By solving the
model similarly to the original model, the equilibrium wage is obtained as
w =
[1  (2n  1)]ez + (2n  1)(1 + )
2n
:
Dierentiating this with respect to ez yields
@w
@ez = 1  (2n  1)2n ;
the sign of which is unclear. As a natural consequence, the welfare eect of
a decrease in ez is unclear.
However, a numerical simulation enables us to know an interesting rela-
tionship between per-capita welfare W and ez. To see this, let us derive the
closed form of W . Tedious manipulations lead to
W = (1 + ) ln
"
(2n  1)(1 + )
n f[1  (2n  1)]ez + (2n  1)(1 + )g
#
+  ln
"
L
(1 + )f
#
+ (1  ez) lnn:
While this is a complicated function of parameters, setting  = 1; n = 2 and
L=f = 20 yields
W = 2 ln

3
6  2ez

+ ln 10 + (1  ez) ln 2:
15See the subsection d) for further empirical studies.
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The graph of W above is given by Figure 2 in the ez  W plane.
Figure 2 around here
It is interesting that a reduction in ez raises (resp. lowers) welfare if ez is
smaller (resp. larger) than about 0:1. This implies that trade liberalization in
the form of increasing ez is welfare-enhancing only if the country is suciently
open (ez is low enough).16
c) Competitiveness
Thus far, we have not discussed the competitiveness of monopolistically com-
petitive and oligopolistic rms. However, it is useful to examine how the
competitiveness diers between monopolistically competitive and oligopolis-
tic industries. For this purpose, we dene the competitiveness by an inverse
of the markup (price divided by marginal cost).17 Then, some manipulations
lead to
Competitiveness of monopolistically competitive rms = 
Competitiveness of oligopolistic rms =
2n  1
2n
;
for trading rms.18 These results are intuitively natural. Since the elasticity
of substitution is 1=(1   ) and increases with , higher  means higher
substitutability among dierentiated products, and hence the goods price
approaches marginal cost, i.e. the competitiveness rises. Similarly, as n
increases, each oligopolistic rm produces more, and hence the goods price
converges to marginal cost and the competitiveness rises. Given these results,
16The same result is analytically obtained in Kreickemeier and Meland (2013) even
though the model is quite dierent.
17Nothing changes even if the inverse of the Lerner Index ((p MC)=p) is used, where
MC denotes marginal cost.
18The counterparts of non-trading rms are respectively  (monopolistically competitive
rms) and (n  1)=n (oligopolistic rms).
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we can say that monopolistically competitive rms are more competitive than
oligopolistic rms if and only if  > (2n   1)=2n for the trading industries
and  > (n  1)=n for the non-trading industries.
d) Relation to empirics
While the monopolistic competition model with massless rms dominated in
trade theory over the last decade, recent evidence suggests the substantial
role of large rms in international trade.19 Introducing several empirical
works, this subsection discusses how our theory is related to them.
As introduced in Introduction, Bernard et al. (2007) and Mayer and Otta-
viano (2008) are two of the earliest papers that empirically nd that exports
are highly concentrated on a small number of large rms.20 Given this fact,
some papers employed an oligopoly model to study the eect of trade liber-
alization quantitatively. Atkeson and Burstein (2008) show that incomplete
pass-through and pricing-to-market are well explained in a Cournot model
rather than the monopolistic competition model. Edmond et al. (2015) apply
the Atkeson-Burstein model to examine the welfare eect of trade liberaliza-
tion, and nd that the opening of trade of Taiwan reduces the product market
distortions by about 1/5, i.e. the pro-competitive gains from trade are signif-
icant. Considering China's WTO accession in 2001, Lu and Yu (2015) also
nd that trade liberalization reduces markup dispersion. Selecting seven
industries, Sutton and Treer (2016, p. 829) nd that `just four rms in
each industry produce between 21 percent and 70 percent of global output.'
Using the data of India from 1989 to 1997, De Loecker et al. (2016) em-
pirically demonstrate that that trade liberalization exerted pro-competitive
pressure on markups. All of these previous works suggest the usefulness of
the oligopoly model in analyzing international trade today and supplements
19Head and Spencer (2017) review the recent revival of oligopoly models of international
trade in relation to empirical evidence.
20Bernard et al. (2018) provide a comprehensive account of global rms theoretically
and empirically.
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the monopolistic competition model.
Furthermore, Hottman et al. (2016) nd a more interesting result. Using
barcode data, they show that half of output in a product group is produced
by ve rms and that 98% have market share less than 2%. Their result
clearly suggests that both large oligopolists and small monopolistically com-
petitive rms coexist, and thus providing an empirical support for the theo-
retical analysis in Shimomura and Thisse (2012), Parenti (2018) and Vavoura
(2017). Although our treatment is dierent from these authors in the sense
that we are considering the coexistence of monopolistically competitive and
oligopolistic industries, the evidence of Hottman et al. (2016) may support
our model.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have considered some implications for international trade of a coex-
istence of monopolistic competition and an oligopoly, which is a recent topic
in industrial organization. While the previous works assume a coexistence
of two kinds of rms, we suppose a coexistence of two kinds of industries
by utilizing Neary's (2003, 2016) approach. Then, we have shown that an
increase in market size raises the productivity of all industries and welfare.
But, if the share of trading sectors rises, the productivity of trading indus-
tries improves, but that of non-trading industries worsens. However, our
numerical simulation ensures a welfare improvement from an increase in the
proportion of trading industries.
We believe that our results shed light on the ongoing debate on global-
ization, but recognize that a number of limitations remain. First, we have
assumed that ez is exogenous, following the existing literature on the GOLE
model. This simplies analysis, but the reallocation eect of Melitz (2003) is
excluded. Given the theoretical and empirical importance of the reallocation
eect, it is needed to reexamine the eect of trade liberalization by endog-
enizing ez. Second, trade barriers such as transport costs and import taris
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are assumed way. This is because they extremely complicate analysis, and
nothing clear is obtained. However, in view of the reality that reductions in
transport costs and/or import taris are a driving force for expanding world
trade, it is needed to incorporate them. Third, our results hinge on the spe-
cic functional forms, e.g. logarithmic utility, and many other restrictions.
Finally, we have made no empirical analysis. Further research is called for
so as to take into account these limitations.
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